In April 1996, laboratory testing of imported nonhuman primates (as mandated by quarantine regulations) identified 2 cynomolgus macaques (Macaca fascicularis) infected with Ebola (subtype Reston) virus in a US-registered quarantine facility. The animals were part of a shipment of 100 nonhuman primates recently imported from the Philippines. Two additional infected animals, who were thought to be in the incubation phase, were identified among the remaining 48 animals in the affected quarantine room. The other 50 macaques, who had been held in a separate isolation room, remained asymptomatic, and none of these animals seroconverted during an extended quarantine period. Due to the rigorous routine safety precautions, the facility personnel had no unprotected exposures and remained asymptomatic, and no one seroconverted. The mandatory quarantine and laboratory testing requirements, put in place after the original Reston outbreak in 1989 -1990, were effective for detecting and containing Ebola virus infection in newly imported nonhuman primates and minimizing potential human transmission.
Since identified, filoviruses have been responsible for both eral persons in both countries [9, 10] . In the Philippines, an epidemiologic investigation documented active transmission in large epidemics (Marburg [MBG] virus in 1967 and Ebola [EBO] virus in 1976, 1979, 1995, and 1996) and isolated human the export facility that was the source of several shipments of infected primates to the United States [10] . The original source cases with occasional secondary infections (MBG virus in 1975 , 1980 , and 1987 and EBO virus in 1977 and 1984 [1 - of EBO-R for the export facility remains unknown. In 1992, the same facility exported infected animals to Italy [11] despite 4]. In most of these episodes, the source of infection for the index case has remained unknown. Despite some progress in reported depopulation measures taken in 1990. On 30 March 1996, a cynomolgus monkey that had been the diagnostic evaluation, molecular virology, and epidemiology of filoviruses and in the medical management of filovirusimported from the Philippines and held in a licensed commercial quarantine facility in Texas died after a 3-day illness charinfected patients, the natural animal or plant reservoir of MBG and EBO viruses remains elusive.
acterized by anorexia and lethargy. On 11 April, EBO virus infection was confirmed by antigen-detection testing (as reAfrican nonhuman primates were the source of the original MBG epidemic in 1967 [5] and of two recent EBO episodes quired by federal regulation [12, 13] ) of a liver specimen obtained from the animal, and EBO particles were seen by elecin Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon [3, 6] . In 1989 and 1990, epizootics of EBO hemorrhagic fever in cynomolgus monkeys (Macaca tron microscopy in plasma from the animal. On 8 April, a second primate housed in the same room had similar signs of fascicularis imported from the Philippines) occurred at several registered quarantine facilities in the United States and led to illness and was euthanatized on 13 April after EBO antigen and particles were detected in the blood of the first animal. the description of a new member of the family Filoviridae, EBO (subtype Reston; EBO-R) virus [7, 8] . Although very The 2 primates were part of a shipment of 100 cynomolgus monkeys from the same Philippine facility that exported the pathogenic for nonhuman primates, this strain was not responsi-EBO-infected animals in 1989 and 1990. ling PB, unpublished data).
Human surveillance. All personnel who were exposed to this nonhuman primate shipment, whether involved in the transportation or care and feeding, were monitored for at least 31 days after CA) adsorbed to 96-well microtiter plates and then by allowing When the animals in room 8 were euthanatized, personnel who the captured IgM to react with viral antigen (crude suspension of obtained blood samples from or who did partial necropsies on the medium and EBO-R-infected Vero E6 cells, inactivated with animals wore full-face respirator masks (Positive Air Purifying 50,000 Gy, freeze-thawed twice, and sonicated), and then measurRespirator; RACAL Health and Safety, Frederick, MD) with ing bound antigen by the use of a hyperimmune rabbit serum and HEPA-filtered air input in addition to the previously described an appropriate enzyme conjugate and substrate. Each serum was protective equipment.
Materials and Methods
tested in parallel with uninfected control antigen (uninfected cells During the course of the investigation, clinical and therapeutic suspension). records were analyzed, and safety and disinfection procedures were IgG ELISAs were performed by coating the polyvinyl chloride reviewed and reinforced.
microtiter plates overnight at 4ЊC with a basic buffer detergent Sample collection. Hereafter, the animals will be referred to extract of uninfected and EBO-R-infected Vero E6 cells that were by room and cage number (e.g., the animal in cage 1 in room 7 further inactivated by 50,000 Gy. Sera were diluted 1:100 and 4-will be referred to as 7-1). Tissues (lung, heart, liver, kidney, fold through 1:6400 in 5% nonfat milk in PBS-Tween and allowed gastrointestinal tract) and serum from the first sick animal (no. 8-to react with the coating antigen. Bound IgG was detected with 2; died on 30 March) and serum from a subsequent acutely ill goat anti-human IgG conjugated to horseradish peroxidase. ABTS animal (no. 8-44) were sent, according to CDC quarantine require-(Kirkegaard & Perry, Gaithersburg, MD) was used as substrate. ments, to the Microbiological Associates, Inc. laboratory for EBO For both IgG and IgM assays, optical densities at 410 nm (OD 410 ) antigen-detection testing by ELISA.
were recorded, and the OD 410 of the negative antigen-coated well On 15 April, a few animals in both rooms were anorexic; there-(IgG) or the negative antigen step (IgM) was subtracted from its fore, blood was obtained for testing. On 17 April, all animals in corresponding positive antigen well to yield the adjusted OD 410 . room 8 were euthanatized to avoid further transmission of the Virus isolation. Virus isolation attempts were done under virus. Individually, the animals were anesthetized with Ketamine BSL-4 containment in 25-cm 2 flasks of Vero E6 cells by absorption and samples were taken from each. Blood was obtained by intracarwith 100 mL of either blood or 10% liver suspensions for 1 h at diac puncture. After an abdominal incision, a small piece of liver 37ЊC. Additional medium (Eagle MEM with Earle's balanced salts was collected, and portions were placed on dry ice and in formalin.
and 5% heat-inactivated fetal bovine serum) was then added. Me-A piece of skin was also collected from the nape of the neck and dium was changed after 5-7 days. Cells were observed for cytoplaced in formalin. Testicles were also collected from all animals pathic effect for 2 weeks and blind passaged for another 2 weeks. and put in formalin. The animals were then humanely euthanatized All cell cultures were tested after each passage for viral antigen by by American Veterinary Medical Association-approved methods.
indirect immunofluorescent staining with anti-EBO hyperimmune Carcasses and potentially contaminated waste were double-bagged rabbit serum and fluorescein isothiocyanate-conjugated anti-rabbit and disinfected with detergent solutions before being removed from the room for incineration. Specimens were then packed and made in goat. within mononuclear phagocytic and endothelial cells ( figure  1A , B). All but 2 liver specimens from the 48 remaining animals in Results the affected room were negative for EBO by immunohistochemistry. Animals 8-45 and 8-50 both showed focal immunoAntibody and antigen detection, virus isolation, and PCR. Sera that were obtained from the 100 animals 1 day after staining of Kupffer's cells ( figure 1C ). Skin specimens were examined to evaluate the skin-biopsy technique in primates, their arrival (22 March) were all negative by antigen-capture, IgG, and IgM-capture ELISA (table 1). Virus isolation was following the recent information on the presence of EBO antigen in skin tissues of a fatal human case [16], but they were attempted on the initial serum samples obtained from the animals who were subsequently found positive, but all were negative for all 48 animals, including those found positive by other laboratory tests. Testicular tissues from all 48 animals negative.
None of the 50 animals in room 8 (8-1 through 8-50) develwere also negative for EBO. oped EBO-specific IgG or IgM. Animal 8-2 died on 30 March and was positive for filovirus antigen by ELISA and viral RNA Discussion by PCR in the liver and the serum; virus was isolated from the liver but not from the serum (the serum specimen had been As shown during the 1989 -1990 Reston outbreak and more recently during the 1995 human EBO epidemic in the Demoheat-inactivated at 60ЊC for 1 h). Virus was isolated from the blood of animal 8-44 (euthanatized on 13 April), and virus cratic Republic of the Congo, the only accurate diagnostic tests for acute EBO disease are the detection of antigen, virus, or antigen and RNA were detected. When the remainder of the animals in the room were euthanatized on 17 April, blood and part of the viral genome in the blood or tissues of dead or dying subjects. All three methods have positive aspects and liver specimens of all but 2 animals were negative by antigen detection, virus isolation, and PCR assays. The liver of animal should be used in combination. The ELISA is a quick, easy, and very robust diagnostic test and is particularly adapted for 8-45 was positive for EBO virus by antigen detection, PCR, and virus isolation, whereas the blood was positive only by the processing of a large number of specimens. The isolation of virus requires a minimum of 7 -14 days and a BSL-4 laboravirus isolation. Animal 8-50 was found positive only by virus isolation from the blood.
tory, but it offers an opportunity for further study of the isolated virus. The amplification of EBO RNA directly from the tissues All animals in room 7 (7-1 through 7-50) remained alive during the extended quarantine period. All animals were tested or blood can be done in a few hours by a well-equipped and specialized laboratory and provides genetic information useful for IgG, IgM, and antigen, and were found negative on 23 April (32 days after their arrival) and 8 May (47 days after for epidemiologic and phylogenetic analyses. In this case, the sequence of the glycoprotein gene was shown to be nearly their arrival). During this period, a few animals were tested again when they appeared ill (7-5, 7-21, 7-29 to 7-31, and 7-identical to the original 1989 EBO-R virus. Specimens for * IHC was also positive on heart, kidney, lung, and gastrointestinal tract of this animal. † Serum was heat inactivated.
immunohistochemistry are easy to collect, formalin fixation close to each other (figure 2), and no instruments were shared between them, thus eliminating an obvious possible mode of renders them safe for transport, and the results are important for understanding the pathogenesis of the disease. The immunotransmission. If infection occurred prior to arrival, the 19-day incubation period for the second animal is certainly close histochemistry data obtained in this study showed that the skinbiopsy test cannot be used to assess animals early in the incubato the limit, but there are few experimental data on incubation times following a low-dose inoculation with EBO-R. tion phase and should be reserved for use on dead or dying animals.
These animals also differed in the duration of disease; the first one died after a 3-day illness, while the second was euthaThe adequacy of the current quarantine procedures are well illustrated by this outbreak. The fact that none of the sera natized after a 5-day illness (on confirmation of EBO virus disease in the first animal). Animal 8-44 was euthanatized on collected on arrival were positive shows that testing blood samples of animals before exportation or immediately on ar-13 April, and an asymptomatic adjacent animal (8-45) was determined to be positive on necropsy on 17 April. Direct rival in the United States is unlikely to detect asymptomatic EBO-infected animals. The nonspecific signs (e.g., fever, ancontact between both animals or between infected-animal excreta and the naive animal was possible and could explain this orexia, lethargy) observed in the first 2 EBO virus -infected animals of this outbreak were identical to the signs observed transmission. Fifteen days separated the death of the first animal and illness in the last EBO-positive animal found at necduring the 1989 -1990 outbreak [7, 10, 17, 18] . This strongly supports both the need to monitor imported nonhuman primates ropsy (8-50). These 2 animals were housed opposite each other and had no direct contact that might have led to disease transfor illness during the mandatory 31-day quarantine and the need to test animals that die or become ill with such signs mission. Other possible modes of transmission between noncontiguous cages are possible: projection of excreta between during quarantine.
The apparent transmission of EBO virus between the anianimals; aerosols, possibly generated by the high-pressure hoses used to clean the excreta at the bottom of the cages; mals within the room (figure 2) raises several questions. The first animal (8-2), which was probably in the incubation phase carry-over of infectious secretions on animal caretakers' gloves that were not changed between procedures, such as tube feedduring the trip and the initial days of the quarantine, became symptomatic on 27 March 1996 (6 days after arriving) and ings; and remaining infectious secretions on the nasogastric tubes despite disinfection. / 9d49$$se26 12-28-98 09:21:18 jinfa UC: J Infect Table 2 . Current quarantine regulations and requirements concerning imported rhesus, cynomolgus, and African green monkeys.
1. CDC will no longer require the routine collection of serum samples from all animals upon entry into quarantine.
2. If an animal dies or is euthanatized for any reason other than trauma during quarantine (including during the first week), liver tissue from the animal must be tested for filovirus antigen using the antigen-capture ELISA. If an animal tested is positive, the Division of Quarantine (DQ), National Center for Infectious Diseases (NCID), should be notified within 24 h by telephone (404-639-8108), facsimile (404-639-2599), or pager (evenings, weekends, and holidays: 404-415-0597). CDC will work directly with the importer regarding additional testing requirements and release of the shipment from quarantine. All animals must remain in quarantine as a unit until testing is complete.
3. If any animals exhibit signs of illness suggestive of filovirus infection (see list below) during the initial quarantine period, serum samples should be collected on day 31 of quarantine and tested for antibodies to filovirus (see item 4 below for specific test methodology) while the entire shipment remains in quarantine. The signs of illness that warrant testing are: a. Diarrhea with melena or frank blood b. Bleeding from external orifices c. Petechial to suffusive hemorrhage d. Sudden death If any animals tested are filovirus antibody positive, DQ, NCID, should be notified within 24 h (see instructions under item 2). CDC will work directly with the importer regarding additional testing requirements and release of the shipment from quarantine.
4. Serum should be tested for IgG antibodies to filovirus using the ELISA. Indirect fluorescent antibody test results will no longer be accepted for this purpose.
NOTE. From Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Division of Quarantine, letter dated 25 March 1996.
of the research community, animal rights groups, and the thus, strict depopulation measures are justified. In addition, the strict application of facility and personal isolation procedures regulatory agencies, the regulations related to the exportation of nonhuman primates from the Philippines were changed.
between quarantine rooms stopped the spread of the virus and spared other animals in the facility, including the second cohort For several years, exporters in most countries have been allowed to sell only purpose-bred animals, not wild-caught of 50 animals from the same shipment. Inclusion of other infectious agents, such as MBG virus, in the diagnostic testing animals. However, wild-caught animals continued to be used as breeding stock. The same Philippine exporter was the requirements and application of similar requirements for the importation of other nonhuman primate species are under consupplier of the primates involved in the 1989 -1990 Reston outbreak and the Italian EBO episode in 1992 [1, 11] . In May sideration. 1996, an epidemiologic investigation at the export facility in the Philippines revealed ongoing transmission among the
